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Abstract
This paper addresses the existence of Nash networks for the one-way ﬂow model of Bala
and Goyal (2000) in a number of diﬀerent settings. First, we provide conditions for
the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heteroge-
nous and players obtain resources from others only through the directed path between
them. We ﬁnd that costs of establishing links play a vital role in the existence of Nash
networks. Next we examine the existence of Nash networks when there are congestion
eﬀects in the model. Then, we provide conditions for the existence of Nash networks in
a model where a player’s payoﬀ depends on the number of links she has established as
1well as on the number of links that other players in the population have created. More
precisely, we show that convexity and increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences allow for the
existence of Nash networks.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D85
Key Words: Network Formation, Non-cooperative Games
2Introduction
The importance of networks in economic and social activities has led to the emer-
gence of a growing literature seeking to understand the formation of these networks.
This literature in economics has focused on three main questions: Given that decisions
are made by self-interested players (i) What is the set of stable networks? (ii) What
networks are eﬃcient? and (iii) Is there a conﬂict between the set of stable and eﬃcient
networks? We can discern two distinct strands in the literature diﬀerentiated by the
type of stability concept used.
The ﬁrst type employs the notion of pairwise stability and its variants and is inspired
by Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996, [9]) work. These authors assume that a link is formed
if both players involved in a link agree to form that link, though link deletion occurs
unilaterally. While beneﬁts depend on the overall graph, the cost of setting up a rela-
tionship is shared equally between the two participating players. In a pairwise stable
network no pair of players has an incentive to form a link and no player has an incentive
to delete a link. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of pairwise stable
networks can be found in Jackson and Watts (2001, [8]) .
The second literature develops a non-cooperative version of network formation. This
literature was initiated by Bala and Goyal (BG, 2000, [1]) and assumes that a player
can establish a link with another without the latter’s consent, as long as she incurs the
cost of forming the link. The authors present two versions of their model: the two-way
ﬂow model and the one-way ﬂow model. The two-way ﬂow models and consent or pair-
3wise stability type models are the two extremes with the one-way ﬂow model being in
between the two.
Observe that in the pairwise stability type of models, in order to have two way ﬂow
of information, both players must pay a cost and agree to the link between them. In
the two-way ﬂow model, both players have access to each others information regardless
of who initiates the link. Of course, as mentioned above, the initiating player bears the
link formation cost. Consent issues are completely absent in this model. In the one-way
ﬂow model, only the (link) initiating player has access to the other player’s informa-
tion. Thus the importance of this model stems from the fact that it lies somewhere
between the consent and no-consent models. While it does not explicitly require the
other player’s acquiescence, player i has to incur link formation costs to access player j’s
resources. To permit two-way information ﬂow in this model both players have to incur
the costs of a link. For both one-way and two-way ﬂow models, the corresponding static
stable networks are called Nash networks since Nash equilibrium is used to determine
stability.
Most of the existing studies have explored the characterization of Nash networks,
either in the two-way ﬂow model (Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2005, [5]), Haller
and Sarangi (2005,[7])) or in the one-way ﬂow model (Galeotti (2004, [4]), Billand and
Bravard (2005, [3])). The existence of Nash networks however has not been studied in
great detail. Although BG (2000) provide a constructive proof of the existence of Nash
networks in their original paper this is done in a very restrictive setting – assuming
that all costs and beneﬁts are homogeneous across players. In a recent paper Haller,
4Kamphorst and Sarangi (2005, [6]) study the existence of Nash networks in two-way
ﬂow models by incorporating value, cost and link heterogeneity. The existence issue
had remained unexplored in the one-way ﬂow setting.
In this paper, we investigate the existence of Nash networks in BG’s one-way ﬂow
model. In the existing literature, there are two types of formulations based on the
one-way ﬂow model.
− In the ﬁrst formulation, a player obtains resources from another player if and only
if there exists a directed path between the two as in BG (2000). In the rest of
the paper we refer to this framework as the (one-way ﬂow) model with transitive
spillovers (MTS).
− In the second set of models, a player’s payoﬀ depends on the number of links
she has formed as well as the number of links the other players in the population
have established. This framework has been used by Billand and Bravard (2004,
[2]). In what follows, we call this framework the (one-way ﬂow) model with global
spillovers (MGS).
The existence of Nash networks in the MTS framework has been studied by BG (2000),
when costs and values of links are homogeneous. But the existence of Nash networks has
not been examined when costs and values of links are heterogeneous. The question of
existence of equilibria under heterogeneity is important for several reasons. Firstly, the
model with heterogeneity provides a robustness check for the results obtained from the
model with homogeneous parameters. Secondly and more importantly, ex-ante asym-
metries across players arise quite naturally in reality. For instance, in the context of
5information networks, it is often the case that some individuals are better informed,
which makes them more valuable contacts. Similarly, as individuals diﬀer, it seems nat-
ural that forming links is cheaper for some individuals as compared to others. Thirdly,
our results complement the existing literature. Galeotti, (2004, [4]) characterizes the
(strict) Nash networks when cost and values of links are heterogeneous. Yet we do not
know under what conditions such equilibria exist. Finally, the existence of Nash net-
works in the MTS framework has never been studied, when there are congestion eﬀects.
Indeed, Billand and Bravard (2005, [3]) extend the model of BG (2000) and introduce
the possibility of congestion eﬀects. These eﬀects exist in several instances where get-
ting too many resources can actually prove an hindrance to agents. For instance, when
researchers are seeking to get some information about a part of their ﬁeld which they
are unsure about, they often read a literature survey written by another scholar. This
activity is costly in terms of time and eﬀort, for instance, to identify relevant information
sources. The reading eﬀort can be expensive and tedious if they are too many sources.
In extreme cases, if a survey is too exhaustive, it might have little or no value to the
scholarly reader. Billand and Bravard (2005, [3]) characterize Nash networks when this
assumption arises. However, they do not address the issue of existence of Nash networks.
The existence of Nash networks in MGS has never been studied. However, this
framework can be useful as well, particularly in industrial organization applications.
Indeed, prior to competing on the market, ﬁrms often have the opportunity to pick up
externalities of other ﬁrms via economic intelligence activities (Prescott, Gibbons, 1993,
[10]). These activities, which can be interpreted as directed links, include among others
reading of industry trade press or patent literature, talking with technology vendors,
6sales representative or industy experts, visiting the commercial trade fairs and analyz-
ing the competitors’ product. In an oligopoly market, the competitive strength of a ﬁrm
depends both on the number of links she has formed and on the number of links the
competitors have formed.
This framework has been explored by Billand and Bravard (2004, [2]) which character-
ize the Nash networks in that kind of frameworks. Thus our paper contributes to the
literature by resolving the existence question for such networks.
We now provide a quick overview of the results for both types of models.
− MTS models: We show that there does not always exist a Nash network in MTS
models when costs and values are heterogeneous. More precisely, we show that,
as in the two-way ﬂow model, heterogeneity of cost in forming links plays a great
role in the non existence of Nash network. We then provide conditions on costs
of setting links to allow for the existence of Nash networks. We also show that if
costs are homogeneous, then there always exist Nash networks. Finally, we show
that if costs and values are homogeneous, but congestion eﬀects can occur, then a
Nash network does not always exist.
− MGS models: We provide economically appealing conditions for the existence of
Nash networks in MGS models. We show that in the MGS framework there always
exists a Nash network when the players’ utility functions satisfy the decreasing
diﬀerence property or when each player’s utility function is discretely convex with
respect to the total number of links this player has established. Moreover, we give
a general characterization of Nash networks when the players’ utility functions
7satisfy the decreasing diﬀerence property and discrete convexity with respect to
the total number of links that each player initiates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we set the basic model
and study existence in the MTS model under various heterogeneity conditions for costs
and values. We conclude this section by examining the model with congestion eﬀects.
Section 2 is devoted to the MGS model. The ﬁrst part examines existence in the presence
of increasing and decreasing diﬀerences. The second part focuses on the characterization
and existence of Nash networks under discrete convexity. Section 3 concludes.
1 One-way Flow Model with Transitivity
In this section, we describe the model of one-way ﬂow networks. This is followed by an
examination of existence in the model without congestion eﬀects. Next, we re-examine
the issue incorporating congestion eﬀects.
1.1 Model Setup
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of players. The network relations among these players are
formally represented by directed graphs whose nodes are identiﬁed with the players. A
network g = (N,E) is a pair of sets: the set N of players and the edges set E(g) ⊂ N×N
of directed links. A link initiated by player i to player j is denoted by i,j. Pictorially
this is depicted as link from j to i to show the direction of information ﬂow.1 Each player
1Throughout the paper we refer to this as link from j to i. The same is true for other network
components like paths.
8i chooses a strategy gi = (gi,1,...,gi,i−1,gi,i+1,...,gi,n), gi,j ∈ {0,1} for all j ∈ N \{i},
which describes the act of establishing links. More precisely, gi,j = 1 if and only if
i,j ∈ E(g). The interpretation of gi,j = 1 is that player i forms a link with player j  = i,
and the interpretation of gi,j = 0 is that i does not form a link with player j. We only
use pure strategies. Note that gi,j = 1 does not necessarily imply that gj,i = 1. It can
be that i is linked to j, but j is not linked to i. Let G = ×n
i=1Gi be the set of all possible
networks where Gi is the set of all possible strategies of player i ∈ N.
We now provide some important graph theoretic deﬁnitions. For a directed graph,
g ∈ G, a path P(g) of length m in g from player j to i, i  = j, is a ﬁnite sequence
i0,i1,...,im of distinct players such that i0 = i, im = j and gik,ik+1 = 1 for k =
0,...,m − 1. If i0 = im, then the path is a cycle. We denote the set of cycles in the
network g by C(g). The complete network g, is a network such that for all i ∈ N,j ∈ N,
we have gi,j = 1. In the empty network, ˙ g, there are no links between any agents.
To sum up, a link from a player j to a player i (gi,j = 1) allows player i to get
resources from player j and since we are in a one-way ﬂow model, this link does not
allow player j to obtain resources from i. Moreover, a player i may receive information
from other players through a sequence of indirect links. To be precise, information ﬂows
from player j to player i, if i and j are linked by a path of length m in g from j to i.
Let
Ni(g) = {j ∈ N| there exists a path in g from j to i},
be the set of players that player i can access in the network g. By deﬁnition, we assume
that i ∈ Ni(g) for all i ∈ N and for all g ∈ G. Let ni(g) be the cardinality of the set
Ni(g). Information received from player j is worth Vi,j to player i. Moreover, i incurs
9a cost ci,j when she initiates a direct link with j, i.e. when gi,j = 1. We can now deﬁne








We assume that ci,j > 0 and Vi,j > 0 for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, i  = j. Moreover, we assume
that, for all i ∈ N, πi(g) = 0 if gi,j = 0 for all j ∈ N, j  = i. In other words, we
assume that Vi,i = 0 for all i ∈ N. The next deﬁnition introduces the diﬀerent notions
of heterogeneity in our model.
Deﬁnition 1 Values (or costs) are said heterogeneous by pairs of players if there exist
i ∈ N, j ∈ N, k ∈ N such that Vi,j  = Vi,k (ci,j  = ci,k) and there exist i′ ∈ N, j′ ∈ N,
k′ ∈ N such that Vj′,i′  = Vk′,i′. Values (or costs) are said heterogeneous by players if for
all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, k ∈ N: Vi,j = Vi,k = Vi (ci,j = ci,k = ci) but there exists i ∈ N, i′ ∈ N
such that Vi  = Vi′ (ci  = ci′).
We now provide some useful deﬁnitions for studying the existence of Nash networks.
Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network obtained when all of player i’s links
are removed. Note that the network g−i can be regarded as the strategy proﬁle where
i chooses to form no links. The network g can be written as g = g−i ⊕ gi, where the
operator ⊕ indicates that g is formed by the union of links in gi and g−i. The strategy
gi is said to be a best response of player i to g−i if:
πi(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ πi(g
′
i ⊕ g−i),for all g
′
i ∈ Gi.
The set of player i’s best responses to g−i is denoted by BRi(g−i). Furthermore, a
10network g = (g1,...,gi,...,gn) is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each
i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 2 We say that two networks g and g′ are adjacent if there is a unique player
i such that gi,j  = g′
i,j for at least one player j  = i and if for all player k  = i, gk,j = g′
k,j,
for all j ∈ N.
An improving path is a sequence of adjacent networks that results when players
form or sever links based on payoﬀ improvement the new network oﬀers over the current
network. More precisely, each network in the sequence diﬀers from the previous one by
the links formed by one unique player. If a player changes her links, then it must be
that this player strictly beneﬁts from such a change.
Deﬁnition 3 Formally, an improving path from a network g to a network g′ is a ﬁnite
sequence of networks g1,...,gk, with g1 = g and gk = g′, such that the two following
conditions are veriﬁed :




there is a unique player i who has changed her strategy;




i  ∈ BRi(gℓ
−i), that is gℓ+1
is a network where i plays a best response while gℓ is a network where i does not
play a best response.
Moreover, if g1 = gk, then the improving path is called an improving cycle.
It is obvious that a network g is a Nash network if and only if it has no improving path
emanating from it.
Finally, we deﬁne η : G →
R, η(g) =
P
i∈N ni(g) as a function.
111.2 Model with Heterogeneous Agents without Congestion Ef-
fect
Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]) outlines a constructive proof of the existence of Nash networks
in the case of costs and values of links homogeneity. Here we begin by showing that in
one-way ﬂow models with cost and value heterogeneity by pairs of players (see Galeotti,
[4] 2004) there always exists a Nash network if the number of players is n = 3. This
result is no longer true if the number of players is n > 4. However, if values of links are
heterogeneous by pairs of players and costs of links are heterogeneous by players, there
always exists a Nash network.
Proposition 1 If the values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs and n = 3,
then a Nash network exists.
Proof Let N = {1,2,3}. We begin with the empty network ˙ g. Either ˙ g is a Nash
network and we are done, or ˙ g is not a Nash network and there exists an improving
path from ˙ g to an adjacent network g1. That is, there exists a player, say without loss
of generality player 1, such that ˙ g1  ∈ BR1(˙ g−1) and g1
1 ∈ BR1(˙ g−1). Since 1 ∈ N has
no link in ˙ g and forms links in g1 = g1
1⊕ ˙ g−1, we have η(˙ g) < η(g1). Now we will repeat
the same step. Assume an improving path from a network g1 to a network gk where
for each player i ∈ N, we have Ni(gk−1) ⊆ Ni(gk). We show that if there exists an
improving path from gk to gk+1, then for each player i ∈ N, Ni(gk) ⊆ Ni(gk+1). Let i




i  ∈ BRi(gk
−i). We show that if j ∈ Ni(gk),
then j ∈ Ni(gk+1). Indeed there are two possibilities for j ∈ Ni(gk).
1. Either gk
i,j = 1, that is i directly obtains the resources of player j. Then there are
12two possibilities.
• If Vi,j −ci,j > 0 then j ∈ Ni(gk+1), otherwise i does not play a best response
in gk+1.
• If Vi,j−ci,j < 0, then there is a network gk′, k′ < k, such that ℓ ∈ Nj(gk′) and
Vi,j + Vi,ℓ − ci,j > max{0,Vi,ℓ − ci,ℓ}, else gk
i,j = 0. Since Nj(gk′
) ⊆ Nj(gk),
for all k′ < k and for all j ∈ N, we have ℓ ∈ Nj(gk) and player i deletes her
link with j only if j ∈ Nℓ(gk) and Vi,j + Vi,ℓ − ci,j < Vi,j + Vi,ℓ − ci,ℓ. In that
case, i forms a link with ℓ and j ∈ Ni(gk+1).
2. Or gk
i,j = 0, gk
i,ℓ = 1 and gk
ℓ,j = 1, that is i indirectly obtains the resources of
player j. Then, we use the same argument as above to show that player i deletes
her link with ℓ only if she has an incentive to form a link with j and j ∈ Ni(gk+1).
We now show that there does not exist any cycle in an improving path Q = {˙ g,g1,...,
gt,...,gt+h,...,gt+h′
,...}, with h′ > h > 0. We note that as j ∈ Ni(gt) and Ni(gt) ⊆
Ni(gt+h), we have j ∈ Ni(gt+h). Also, as g
t+h
i,j = 0, we have g
t+h
i,k = 1 and k ∈ Ni(gt+h).
Moreover, as Ni(gt+h) ⊆ Ni(gt+h′
), we have Ni(gt+h′
) = {j,k}.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that player i deletes the link i,j for the ﬁrst time
between t and t + h. Likewise, we assume that player i forms the link i,j for the ﬁrst
time between t + h and t + h′.
We have two cases.
1. Suppose we have gt
i,k = 0. To obtain a contradiction, assume that k ∈ Ni(gt).
It follows that g
t+h
j,k = 1 since player i does not form the link i,k between gt and
gt+h if j preserves the link j,k. Also j does not delete the link j,k between gt
13and gt+h if i does not form the link i,k (recall that in our process only one player
changes her strategy at each period). Since player i chooses to delete the link
i,j in gt+h, then she must form the link i,k and we must have g
t+h
k,j = 1, since
k ∈ Ni(gt) ⊆ Ni(gt+h). Moreover, we note that the substitution of the link i,j
by the link i,k implies that ci,j > ci,k. Using same argument, player k has not
deleted the link k,j between gt+h and gt+h′
. Therefore, if player i forms the link
i,j in gt+h′
(and so deletes the link i,k), then we have ci,j < ci,k and we obtain
the desired contradiction.
2. Next, suppose that we have gt
i,k = 1. If player i deletes the link i,j in gt+h, then
we obtain the situation in case 1 up to a permutation of players j and k. Hence
the proof follows.
￿
We have shown that if values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs and n = 3,
then there always exists a Nash network. Note that this result is not true for the model
with directed links and two-way ﬂow of resources (see Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi
2005, [6] p. 7). We next show with an example that the above proposition is not valid
for n > 3.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3,4} be the set of players and Vi,j = V for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N.
More precisely, we suppose that c1,3 = V −V/16 and c1,2 = c1,4 = 4V ; c2,1 = 2V −V/16
and c2,3 = c2,4 = 4V ; c3,2 = 2V − V/8, c3,4 = 2V − V/6 and c3,1 = 4V ; c4,1 = 3V − V/8
and c4,2 = c4,3 = 4V .
1. In a best response, player 2 never forms any link with player 3 or player 4. More-
over, player 2 has an incentive to form a link with player 1 if the latter gets
14resources from player 3 or player 4.
2. In a best response, player 4 never forms links with player 3 or player 2.
3. Then the unique best response of player 1 to any network in which she does not
observe player 3 is to add a link with player 3 (since player 2 and player 4 never
form a link with player 3). Moreover, we note that player 1 never has any incentive
to form a link with player 2 or player 4.
4. In a best response, player 3 never forms any link with player 1.
Now let us take those best replies for granted and consider best responses regarding
the remaining links 2,1; 3,2; 3,4 and 4,1. If player 2 initiates link 2,1, then player 3’s
best response is to initiate link 3,2. In that case player 4 must initiate the link 4,1 and
player 3 must replace the link 3,2 by the link 3,4. Then, player 4 must delete the link
4,1 and the player 3 must replace the link 3,4 by the link 3,2. Hence there does not
exist any mutual best response. Therefore, a Nash network does not exist. Finally, by
appropriately adjusting costs it can be veriﬁed that this example holds even if we relax
the assumption that Vi,j = V for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N.
1.2.1 Existence of Nash networks and heterogeneity of values by pairs
We now prove the existence of Nash networks when values are heterogeneous by pairs
and costs are heterogeneous by players. First, when values are heterogeneous by pairs










i(g) be the marginal payoﬀ of player i from player j in the network g. If gi,j = 1,
then π
j
i(g) = πi(g) − πi(g ⊖ i,j). Let K(g;i,j) = Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j), where











Vi,k − ci. (1)
Proposition 2 If values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are het-
erogeneous by players, then a Nash network exists.
The proof of Proposition 2 is long involving a number of lemmas. So we ﬁrst pro-
vide a quick overview of the proof. It consists of constructing a sequence of networks,
Q = (g0,...,gt−1,gt,...) beginning with the empty network. In each subsequent net-
work, no player should have an incentive to decrease the amount of resources she obtains.
Note that this sequence of networks is not an improving path. Indeed, we go from gt
to gt+1 in several operations. First, in gt we let a player i ∈ N, who is not playing
a best response in gt, to play a best response (if no such player exists, gt is a Nash
network) and obtain a network called bri(gt). Second, we modify the network bri(gt) as
follows: we construct a cycle using all players j ∈ N who obtain resources from a player
k who forms part of a cycle in bri(gt), while preserving all links in bri(gt) between a
player k ∈ N and a player j who is not part of a cycle in bri(gt). We obtain a network
called h(bri(gt)). Thirdly, we delete all links i,j which does not allow player i to obtain
additional resources in h(bri(gt)). We obtain a network called m(h(bri(gt))) = gt
i, and
in the sequence Q, we have gt+1 = gt
i.
When a player i receive an opportunity to revise her strategy, we go from a network gt−1
to a network gt, and we will show that η(gt−1) > η(gt). Since the amount of resources
that players can obtain in a network g ∈ Q is ﬁnite, Q is ﬁnite and there exists a Nash
16network.
In the following paragraph, we deﬁne a class of networks G3 which contains all net-
works in the sequence Q. Then, we provide a condition which implies that no player has
an incentive to delete a link in a network g ∈ G3 (Lemma 2). Finally, we show that all
networks gt ∈ Q satisfy this condition since the empty network satisﬁes this condition
(Lemma 6).
Let us formally deﬁne the set G3. Let M : G → P(G), g  → M(g) ⊂ G be a
correspondence. Let m(g) ∈ M(g) be a minimal network associated to the network g,
m(g) is a network such that, for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, Ni(g) = Ni(m(g)) and if m(g)i,j = 1,
then j  ∈ Ni(m(g) ⊖ i,j) and gi,j = 1. We note that in a network m(g) ∈ M(g), there
is at most one path from a player i ∈ N to a player j ∈ N. In the following, we can
take, without loss of generality, any element of M(g). Let m(g) be a typical element of
M(g). Obviously, we have η(g) = η(m(g)).
We say that g is a minimal network if g = m(g). We denote by Gm the set of
minimal networks. Let G1 = {g ∈ Gm|i ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Ni(g),k  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ gk,i = 0} be a
subset of minimal networks. Essentially these are networks there there can be no more
than one cycle involving any triad of players. Let G2 ⊂ G1 be the set of networks which
belong to G1 and which contain at most one cycle. If g ∈ G2 and g contains a cycle,
then we denote by C(g) the cycle in the network g. We denote by NC(g) the set of
players who belong to the cycle C(g), and EC(g) ⊂ NC(g) ×NC(g) the set of links which
belong to the cycle C(g). Let G3 = {g ∈ G2|i ∈ C(g),j  ∈ C(g) ⇒ gj,i = 0} be the set
of networks which belong to G2 and where there does not exist any link from a player
17j  ∈ C(g) to a player i ∈ C(g).
We now present some lemmas which allow us to prove Proposition 2. The ﬁrst lemma
presents some properties about links that cannot arise in the set G3.
Lemma 1 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are
heterogeneous by players and g ∈ G3.
1. If gj,i = 1, then there does not exist a player k such that gk,i = 1.
2. If gi,j = 1, then K(g;i,j) = Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j) is an empty set.
Proof We successively prove both parts of the lemma.
1. To obtain a contradiction suppose that there exist two players i and j such that
gj,i = 1 and gk,i = 1 in g ∈ G3. Then there are two possibilities:
Suppose i ∈ NC(g). Given that i ∈ NC(g) there can be at most one link to player
i. Hence j / ∈ NC(g) and k  ∈ NC(g) simultaneously. Only one of them is in NC(g).
Without loss of generality let j ∈ NC(g). Then gk,i = 1 violates the fact that
g ∈ G3.
Suppose i / ∈ NC(g). Then we know that gi,j = 0 = gi,k since g ∈ G3 ⊆ G1.
From the minimality of g we know that j / ∈ Nk(g) and k / ∈ Nj(g). Putting all
this together we have i ∈ Nj(g), j / ∈ Nk(g), k / ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ gk,i = 0. This is a
contradiction.
2. Suppose there exists a player k ∈ Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j). Then, there exist
two diﬀerent paths from player k to player i which is impossible by the minimality
of g.
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Vi,k − ci. (2)
In the following lemma, we let g′
i ∈ Gi be a strategy of player i, with g′
i  = gi. This
lemma provides the best response properties of the networks g ∈ G3.
Lemma 2 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs, costs of links are hetero-
geneous by players and g ∈ G3.
1. Suppose players i ∈ N, j ∈ N, k ∈ N are such that j  ∈ Ni(g), i ∈ Nj(g),
k  ∈ Nj(g). If g′
k,i = 1, then g′
k  ∈ BRk(g−k).
2. Suppose g contains a cycle C(g) and for all i ∈ NC(g), and for all i,j ∈ EC(g), we
have π
j
i(g) > 0. If g′
i,j = 0, then g′
i  ∈ BRi(g−i).
3. Suppose i ∈ N, j ∈ N \ NC(g) and gi,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0. If g′
i,j = 0, then
g′
i  ∈ BRi(g−i).
Proof We now prove each part of the lemma.
1. Let players i, j and k be such that j  ∈ Ni(g), i ∈ Nj(g) and k  ∈ Nj(g). By lemma
1.1, we know that gk,i = 0. Either already i ∈ Nk(g) and the formation of the link
k,i is not a best response for player k, or i  ∈ Nk(g). In the latter case, we have
j  ∈ Nk(g), Ni(g) ⊂ Nj(g), so πk(g ⊕ k,j) − πk(g ⊕ k,i) ≥ Vk,j > 0. From this it
follows that player k does not play a best response if she forms a link with player
i.
192. Without loss of generality, let C(g) be such that NC(g) = {1,2,...,p} and EC(g) =
{1;1,2;2,3;...;p − 1,p;p,1}. For simplicity now consider a player i  = p.
It is straightforward from π
i−1
i (g) > 0 and the minimality of g that player i does
not play a best response if she deletes the link i,i−1 ∈ EC(g) and does not replace
that link.
We ﬁrst show that player i cannot play a best response if she replaces the link
i,i−1 by a link i,k, with k  = i−1. Indeed, if player i replaces the link i,i−1 by
a link i,k, k ∈ Ni(g), then player i is not playing a best response.
We now show that if player i replaces the link i,i − 1 by a link i,k, k  ∈ Ni(g),
then player i does not play a best response. Indeed, since g ∈ G3, there does
not exist a player k  ∈ Ni(g), with k ∈ N \ NC(g), such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and
ℓ ∈ NC(g). Otherwise, there exist a player k′ ∈ N \ NC(g), with k ∈ Nk′(g), and
a player ℓ′ ∈ NC(g) such that gk′,ℓ′ = 1. In that case, g  ∈ G3 and we obtain
a contradiction. Likewise, there does not exist a player k  ∈ Ni(g) such that
ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ Ni(g)\NC(g). Indeed, if ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ Ni(g)\NC(g), then
there exists a player ℓ′ such that gℓ′,ℓ = 1, with ℓ′ ∈ Ni(g) and a player k′ such
that gk′,ℓ = 1, with k′ ∈ Nk(g) which is impossible by lemma 1.1. It follows that a
player i ∈ NC(g) cannot obtain the resources of a player ℓ ∈ Ni(g)\Ni(g⊖i,i−1)
from a player k  ∈ Ni(g). Hence, if player i replaces the link i,i − 1 ∈ EC(g) by a
link i,k with k  ∈ Ni(g), then player i does not play a best response.
3. It is straightforward from π
j
i(g) > 0 and the minimality of g that player i has no
incentive to delete the link i,j if she does not replace that link.
We now show that player i has no incentive to replace the link i,j. In other words,
20we show that there does not exist a player k who obtains a part of the resources
of j and allows i to obtain more resources than j.
Let k be such that Nk(g)∩Nj(g) = ∅. Then player i has no incentive to substitute
the link i,k to the link i,j. Hence Nk(g) ∩ Nj(g)  = ∅.
First, we must show that if Nk(g) ∩ Nj(g)  = ∅, then either Nk(g) ⊂ Nj(g) or
Nj(g) ⊂ Nk(g). If the former is true the proof is obvious and we will only focus
on the latter. Note that in g, Nk(g)  = Nj(g) since j  ∈ NC(g). To obtain a
contradiction, suppose that Nk(g) ∩ Nj(g)  = ∅, Nk(g) * Nj(g) and Nj(g) *
Nk(g). Then there exist players ℓ ∈ Nj(g) ∩ Nk(g), ℓj ∈ Nj(g) and ℓk ∈ Nk(g),
such that gℓj,ℓ = gℓk,ℓ = 1, which is impossible by Lemma 1.1.
Second, we must show that there does not exist a player k ∈ N, such that Nj(g) ⊂
Nk(g) and Ni(g) * Nk(g), who obtains the resources of j and allows i additional
resources. If Ni(g) = Nk(g), then i ∈ NC(g), k ∈ NC(g) and in that case player i
cannot obtain a part of the resources of player j due to a link with player k, since
g is a minimal network. Therefore, we just need to show that the above statement
is true for strict set inclusion. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists a
player k ∈ N such that Nj(g) ⊂ Nk(g) and Ni(g)  ⊂ Nk(g). Then there exists a
player ℓk ∈ Nk(g) such that gℓk,j = 1. Therefore, we have gℓk,j = 1 and gi,j = 1
which is impossible by Lemma 1.1. Since Nj(g) ⊂ Nk(g), Ni(g) ⊂ Nk(g), and
gi,j = 1, by Lemma 1.2, player i cannot obtain a part of the resources of j due to
her link with player k. Consequently, if player i deletes the link i,j and replaces
it by the link i,k, then she does not play a best response.
￿
21We now introduce some additional deﬁnitions that are required to complete the
proof. Let MBRi(g−i) be a modiﬁed version of the best response function of player
i ∈ N. More precisely, g′
i ∈ MBRi(g−i) if g′
i is a best response of player i against
g−i and if player i does not form any links that yield zero marginal payoﬀs. Let bri :
G → G, g  → bri(g) be a function. The network bri(g) = (g′
i ⊕ g−i) is a network
where g′
i ∈ MBRi(g−i), and all other players j  = i having the same links as in the
network g. In other words, in bri(g), we have bri(g)i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0 and
bri(g)i,j = 0 ⇒ π
j
i(bri(g)) ≤ 0.
Let NC(g) be the set of players who belong to a cycle in g. Let H : G → P(G) be
a correspondence. A network h(g) ∈ H(g) is a network associated with g such that
h(g) contains at most one cycle, C(h(g)). Moreover, if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and
ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(h(g)). If k  ∈ NC(h(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓ,k = h(g)ℓ,k.
This is diﬀerent from the networks in G2 since there is no minimality restriction here.
This operation creates one cycle leaving unchanged the strategies of those players that
do not form a part of the cycle.
Observe that for all g ∈ G and for all k ∈ N, we have, by construction, for all
g′ ∈ M ◦ H(g), Nk(g) ⊆ Nk(g′).
Finally, we deﬁne
g
i ∈ M ◦ H ◦ bri(g), (3)
to be a network obtained from g after performing the three operations deﬁned above.
Note that the superscript in gi refers to the fact that in this network only player i is
playing her best response.
Lemma 3 If g ∈ G3, then gi ∈ G3.
22Proof We must show that gi has the following four properties: it is a minimal network,
it contains at most one cycle, there does not exist a link from j  ∈ NC(gi) to k ∈ NC(gi)
and if ℓ ∈ Nj(gi),j  ∈ Nℓ(gi),k  ∈ Nj(gi) then gi
k,ℓ = 0. The ﬁrst property follows from
the correspondence M and the next two from the correspondence H. We just need to
verify that the last property is enjoyed.
First, we show that in bri(g), we have ℓ ∈ Nj(bri(g)), j  ∈ Nℓ(bri(g)), i  ∈ Nj(bri(g))
⇒ bri (g)i,ℓ = 0. We know that in g we have ℓ ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Nℓ(g),i  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ gi,ℓ = 0
since g ∈ G3. By deﬁnition, we have bri(g)k = gk, for all k ∈ N \ {i}. Hence, if we
show that player i  ∈ Nj(bri(g)) has not formed a link i,ℓ with a player ℓ such that
ℓ ∈ Nj(bri(g)) and j  ∈ Nℓ(bri(g)) in bri(g), then we will have shown the conclusion for
bri(g). But, by Lemma 2.1, we know that if i has formed a link with player ℓ, then i is
not playing a best response which is a contradiction.
Second, by construction, if g is such that ℓ ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Nℓ(g),k  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ g
k,ℓ = 0,
then g′ ∈ M ◦ H(g) is such that ℓ ∈ Nj(g′), j  ∈ Nℓ(g′), k  ∈ Nj(g′) ⇒ g′
k,ℓ = 0. The
conclusion follows. ￿
The next lemma covers properties of networks in gi and bri(g).
Lemma 4 Suppose g ∈ G3 and for all k ∈ N, j ∈ N, gk,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
k(g) > 0.
1. If k ∈ Nj(g), then k ∈ Nj(bri(g)).
2. If k ∈ Nj(g), then k ∈ Nj(gi).
3. If gi  ∈ BRi(g−i), then η(g) < η(gi).
Proof We successively prove each part of the Lemma.
231. Observe that for all k  = i, and for all j ∈ N, we have gk,j = bri(g)k,j. Hence,
if Nj(g) * Nj(bri(g)), then there exists a player k such that k ∈ Ni(g) and
k  ∈ Ni(bri(g)). Since g ∈ G3, we know from Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, that player i will
not be playing a best response if she deletes one of her links. Hence, if k ∈ Ni(g),
then k ∈ Ni(bri(g)), and we obtain the desired conclusion.
2. We know from the ﬁrst part of the lemma that Nj(g) ⊆ Nj(bri(g)), and we know
that Nj(bri(g)) ⊆ Nj(g′), for all g′ ∈ M ◦ H(bri(g)). The result follows.
3. From the second part of the lemma, we know that Nj(g) ⊆ Nj(gi) for all j  = i.
We now show that if gi  ∈ BRi(g−i), then Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(gi). By Lemma 2.2 and
2.3, we know that player i cannot be playing a best response if she deletes links.
Hence, if she is playing a best response, it must be that Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(bri(g)). Since,
we know that, for all g′ ∈ M ◦ H(bri(g)), Ni(bri(g)) ⊆ Ni(g′), we conclude that
Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(gi). Therefore, η(g) < η(gi).
￿
Let us denote by g \ MBRi(g−i) = gm. Then gm ⊕ i,j is the network obtained from
bri(g) when player i forms no link except the link i,j.
Lemma 5 Suppose g ∈ G3.
1. If gi
i,j = bri(g)i,j = 1, then, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, Nj(gm ⊕ i,j) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i,j).
2. Suppose for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, gi,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0. If gi
k,ℓ = gk,ℓ = 1, then
Nℓ(g−k ⊕ k,ℓ) ⊆ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ).
Proof We prove the two parts of the lemma successively.
241. If j  ∈ NC(gi), then Nj(gi
−i) = Nj(gi). Indeed, since gi ∈ G3, j  ∈ NC(gi), and
gi
i,j = 1, player j does not obtain any resources from player i. Moreover, we have




Assume that j ∈ NC(gi), gi
i,j = bri(g)i,j = 1 and there exists a player ℓ such that
ℓ ∈ Nj(gm ⊕ i,j) and ℓ  ∈ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i,j). So in bri(g), player i obtains resources
from player ℓ through a path containing j, and in gi player i obtains resources
from player ℓ through a path which does not contain j, since for all k ∈ N,
Nk(bri(g)) ⊆ Nk(gi). Hence, there is a player j′ where j′ ∈ Ni(gi), j′  ∈ NC(gi)
and j′ ∈ Nj(gi) who has formed a link with player ℓ between bri(g) and gi. This
is not possible by construction.
2. If ℓ  ∈ NC(gi), then Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ) = Nℓ(gi) since player ℓ does not obtain any
resources from player k. Moreover, we know by Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 that Nℓ(g) ⊆
Nℓ(gi). It follows that Nℓ(g−k ⊕ k,ℓ) ⊆ Nℓ(g) ⊆ Nℓ(gi) = Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ).
Suppose now that ℓ ∈ NC(gi). Note that k ∈ NC(gi) since k has formed a link with
ℓ. For a contradiction assume that ℓ ∈ NC(gi) and Nℓ(g−k ⊕k,ℓ) * Nℓ(gi
−k⊕k,ℓ).
Then there is a player j such that j ∈ Nℓ(g−k ⊕k,ℓ) and j  ∈ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕k,ℓ). Also
note that j  ∈ NC(gi), otherwise j ∈ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕k,ℓ). Moreover, if j ∈ Nℓ(g−k ⊕k,ℓ)
and j  ∈ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k,ℓ), then j  ∈ Nk(g ⊖ k,ℓ) and j ∈ Nk(gi ⊖ k,ℓ) since g ∈ G3,
and Nℓ(g) ⊆ Nℓ(gi) by Lemma 4.1 and 4.2. In other words, player k obtains
resources from player j in g through a path which contains ℓ, and in gi player k
obtains resources from player j through a path which does not contain ℓ. Hence,
there exists a player who has formed a link with a player ℓ′ where ℓ′ ∈ Nk(gi),
25j ∈ Nℓ′(gi), and k  ∈ Nℓ′(gi) between g and gi. This is not possible by construction
of gi.
￿
Lemma 6 Let gi be deﬁned as in equation (3).
1. If g ∈ G3, then gi
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gi) > 0.
2. If for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, gi,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0, then for all i ∈ N \ {k}, j ∈ N,
gk
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0.
Proof We now prove successively the two parts of the lemma.
1. (a) First, we show that this property is true if gi
i,j = 1 and j  ∈ NC(gi). If
j  ∈ NC(gi), then by construction bri(g)i,j = 1 and so π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0. Using
















(b) Second, we show that this property is true if gi
i,j = 1 and j ∈ NC(gi). By
construction if gi
i,j = 1 and j ∈ NC(gi), then i ∈ NC(gi). If i ∈ NC(gi),
then by construction of gi, there is at least one player ℓ ∈ NC(gi), such
26that πℓ
i(bri(g)) > 0. So for all players ℓ′ ∈ NC(gi), there exists a network




i ((gi)′). We know by Lemma 5.1, that Nj(gm ⊕
i,j) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i,j). Finally, by Lemma 3, we know that gi ∈ G3. Hence






−i⊕i,j)Vi,k − ci =
P
k∈Nℓ((gi








2. First, we show that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, and for all j  ∈ NC(gk), if gi,j = 1 ⇒
π
j
i(g) > 0, then gk
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0. Indeed, if player i ∈ N \ {k} has a link
with player j  ∈ NC(gk) in gk, then, by construction of gk, player i has a link with
player j in g, so π
j
i(g) > 0. We know, from Lemma 5.2, that for all j ∈ N, we
have Nj(g−i ⊕ i,j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i,j). Moreover, by Lemma 3, gk ∈ G3. So using













Next, we show that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, and for all j ∈ NC(gk), if gi,j = 1 ⇒
π
j
i(g) > 0, then gk
i,j = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0. Since gk ∈ G3 and there exists a link
27from player j to player i, we have i ∈ NC(gk). If i ∈ NC(gk), then there are
two possibilities: either k ∈ Ni(brk(g)) or i ∈ NC(g). We deal with these two
possibilities successively.
(a) If k ∈ Ni(brk(g)), then there exists in brk(g) a link from player i to a player
ℓ such that brk(g)i,ℓ = gi,ℓ = 1 and k ∈ Nℓ(brk(g)). Since, gi,ℓ = 1, we
have πℓ
i(g) > 0. Furthermore, by construction, player ℓ ∈ NC(gk), since
k ∈ Nℓ(brk(g)). We note that for all players h′ ∈ NC(gk), there exists a
network (gk)′ ∈ M ◦ H ◦ brk(g) where player i forms a link with player h′,
and by construction π
j
i(gk) = πh′
i ((gk)′). We know from Lemma 5.2 that
for all j ∈ N, we have Nj(g−i ⊕ i,j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i,j). Finally, we know by
Lemma 3 that gi ∈ G3. Hence, using the marginal proﬁt function deﬁned by






−i⊕i,j)Vi,ℓ′ − ci =
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ((gk
−i)′⊕i,ℓ) Vi,ℓ′ − ci
≥
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ(g−i⊕i,ℓ) Vi,ℓ′ − ci
= πℓ
i(g) > 0.
(b) If i ∈ N
C(g)
, then we have πℓ
i(g) > 0 for i,ℓ ∈ EC(g). We assume, without
loss of generality, that player i forms in C(gi) a link with a player j such
that π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0. By construction of gk we have NC(g) ⊆ NC(gk) and by
Lemma 5.2, we have Nj(g−i ⊕ i,j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i,j) for all j ∈ N. Note that
for all players h′ ∈ NC(gk), there exists a network (gk)′ ∈ M◦H◦brk(g) where




28We know by Lemma 3 that gi ∈ G3. Again, using the marginal proﬁt function
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Proof of Proposition 2 We start with the empty network ˙ g = g0. It is straightforward
to check that g0 ∈ G3. Either g0 is a Nash network, and we are done, or there exists a
player, say i, who does not play a best response in g0. In that case, we construct the
network g1 ∈ M ◦ H ◦ bri(g0). We know from Lemma 4.3 that η(g0) < η(g1). From
Lemma 3, g1 ∈ G3 and from Lemma 6.1 and 6.2, we know that for all players j ∈ N and
ℓ ∈ N, g1
j,ℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(g1) > 0. Either g1 is a Nash network, and we are done, or there
exists a player, say j, who does not play a best response in g1. In that case, we construct
the network g2 ∈ M◦H◦brj(g1). We know from Lemma 4.3 that η(g1) < η(g2). Again
from Lemma 3, g2 ∈ G3 and from Lemma 6.1 and 6.2, we know that for all players
j ∈ N and ℓ ∈ N, g2
j,ℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(g2) > 0. It follows that we can construct a sequence
of networks {g0,g1 ...,gt,...} such that in gt−1, there exists a player, say k, who does
not play a best response, and gt ∈ M ◦ H ◦ brk(gt−1), η(gt−1) < η(gt), gt ∈ G3 and for
all j ∈ N, gt
j,ℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(gt) > 0. This sequence is ﬁnite since η(g) ≤ n2, for all g ∈ G .
￿
29Proposition 2 establishes that if values of links are heterogeneous by pairs of players
and costs of links are heterogeneous by players, then a Nash network always exists. This
result is similar to the result of Haller et al. [6] in two-way ﬂow models. We now study
one-way ﬂow models when values of links are heterogeneous by players and costs of links
are heterogeneous by pairs of players.
1.2.2 Existence of Nash networks and heterogeneity of costs by pairs
In example 1 we have shown that a Nash network does not always exist when values
of links are heterogeneous by players and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs of
players. We now state a condition which allows for the existence of Nash networks when











i(g) denote the marginal payoﬀ of player i from player j in the network g. If
gi,j = 1, then π
j
i(g) = πi(g) − πi(g ⊖ i,j). Let K(g;i,j) = Ni(g ⊖ i,j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i,j).











Vi − ci,j. (4)
To prove the following proposition, we need an additional new deﬁnition. Let Hi : G → G
be a correspondence where hi(g) ∈ Hi(g) satisﬁes the following conditions.
• If g contains at most one cycle and there does not exist any link from a player
j  ∈ C(g) to a player k ∈ C(g), then g = hi(g).
30• If player i has formed a link with no player j ∈ NC(g) or with at least two players
j ∈ NC(g) in g, then
1. if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(hi(g));
2. if k  ∈ NC(hi(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓ,k = hi(g)ℓ,k.
• If player i has formed a link with one and only one player j ∈ NC(g) in g, then:
1. if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(hi(g));
2. if k  ∈ NC(hi(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓ,k = hi(g)ℓ,k;
3. player i and player j belong to NC(hi(g)) and the link i,j ∈ E(hi(g)).
We now deﬁne ˆ g
i as follows: ˆ g
i ∈ M ◦ Hi ◦ bri(g).
Proposition 3 Consider a game where values of links are heterogeneous by players and
costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs. There always exists a Nash network if for all
i ∈ N, j ∈ N, j′ ∈ N: |ci,j − ci,j′| < Vi.
Proof The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of the proposition 2 with ˆ g
i
playing the same role as gi). ￿
Corollary 1 Suppose a game where values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs.
If for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, j′ ∈ N: |ci,j−ci,j′| < mink∈N{Vi,k}, then there is a Nash network.
The importance of these results stems from the fact that they identify conditions under
which Nash networks always exist under heterogeneity.
311.3 Model with Congestion Eﬀect
In one-way ﬂow models with homogeneous players BG [1] establish that Nash networks
always exist. We show that this result is no longer true when the payoﬀ function
incorporates congestion eﬀects – a phenomenon that frequently arises in many network
settings. Billand and Bravard (2005, [3]) characterize Nash networks under congestion
eﬀects. In this section, we use their framework to show the non-existence of Nash
networks.
Let us deﬁne φ : N × {0,...,n − 1} → I R, (x,y)  → φi(x,y) be such that:
φi(x,y) > φi(x,y + 1).
Let ci(g) =
P
j =i gi,j be the costs incurred by i in the network g. We now deﬁne the
payoﬀ function of player i ∈ N as
¯ πi(g) = φi(ni(g),ci(g)).
As before we assume that player i obtains her own resources. We now provide an
example where a Nash network does not exist.
Example 2 Let N = {1,2,3}, and φ1(2,1) > φ1(1,0) > φ1(3,1), max{φk (2,1) ,φk(3,
2)} < φk(1,0) < φk(3,1), for k ∈ {2,3}.
First, networks in which a player forms two links are not Nash.
Second, the unique best response of player 2 (respectively 3) to any network g′ in
which player 1 and player 3 (respectively 2) have formed no link is to form no link.
Moreover, the unique best response of player 1 to a network g in which player 2 and
player 3 have formed no link is to form a link with player 2 or player 3. Therefore, the
empty network is not a Nash network.
32Third, a network g where n1(g)  = 2 cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, it is obvious
that n1(g) = 3 cannot be a Nash network since φ1(1,0) > φ1(3,1) > φ1(3,2). Moreover,
a network g where n1(g) = 1 cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, in a Nash network
where player 1 has formed no links, players 2 and 3 cannot have established any links,
since at least one of these players gets the ressources of one player only and we have
φk(2,1) < φk(1,0), for k ∈ {2,3}. In that case, when players 2 and 3 create no links,
player 1 has an incentive to establish a link with player 2 or player 3. To sum up if there
exists a Nash network g, then n1(g) = 2.
Without loss of generality, we consider networks g in which player 1 has formed a
link with player 2. In these networks,
1. player 2 has not formed a link with player 3 because in that case 2,3 ∈ N1(g) and
player 1 would have an incentive to delete the link 1,2.
2. Player 3 has an incentive to establish a link with player 1, since φ3(1,0) < φ3(3,1).
3. The networks in which a player has formed two links are not Nash networks.
Hence a Nash network does not exist.
2 One-Way Flow Model with Global Spillovers
In this section, we modify the framework in order to describe new situations. More
precisely, in the models of section 1, the payoﬀ of a player i from a link with player j
depends on the identities of both players. In this section, what matters is the number of
33links that player i has formed as well as the total number of links that the other players
have formed.
Recall that the number of links formed by i ∈ N is ci(g) =
P




k =j gj,k denote the number of links formed by all players except i ∈ N, in the
network g. Deﬁne A = {0,...,n − 1} and B = {0,...,(n − 1)2}. The payoﬀ function
of each player i ∈ N is given by ui : A × B → I R,(ci(g),c−i(g))  → ui(ci(g),c−i(g)).
The following example illustrates that a Nash network does not always exist under
this general payoﬀ function.
Example 3 Let N = {1,2,3}. We deﬁne the following payoﬀ function for all i ∈ N:
ui(2,1) > ui(1,0) > ui(0,0),
ui(x,y) < ui(0,0) for all (x,y)  ∈ {(2,1),(1,0)}.
It is obvious that in this example there does not exist any Nash network.
Since Nash networks do not always exist in one-way ﬂow models with global spillovers,
we now provide two conditions which allow the existence of Nash networks under situ-
ations of interest in economics.
The ﬁrst condition is the increasing and decreasing diﬀerences property. The second
condition is the discrete convexity property.
2.1 Increasing and Decreasing Diﬀerences
Deﬁnition 4 The payoﬀ function ui has strictly increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in
its two arguments (ci(g),c−i(g)) if ui(ci(g),c−i(g))−ui(ci(g),c−i(g′)) is strictly increas-
ing (decreasing) in ci(g) for all c−i(g) > c−i(g′). (See Vives, 1999, [12]).
34Let δ(g) =
P
i∈N ci(g), as the total number of links formed in the network g.
Proposition 4 In a one-way ﬂow model with global spillovers and increasing (or de-
creasing) diﬀerences a Nash network always exists.
Proof Consider a one-way ﬂow model with global spillovers and increasing diﬀerences.
To prove the proposition, we begin with the empty network ˙ g. Either ˙ g is Nash and
we are done, or ˙ g is not a Nash network and there exists an improving path from ˙ g to
an adjacent network g1. That is, there exists a player i1 such that ˙ gi1  ∈ BRi1(˙ g−i1)
and g1
i1 ∈ BRi1(g1
−i1). Since i1 had formed no link in ˙ g and forms links in g1, we have
δ(˙ g) < δ(g1). Now, either g1 is Nash and we are done, or there is a player i2 such that
g1
i2  ∈ BRi2(g1
−i2). In that case, there exists an improving path from g1 to an adjacent
network g2 such that g2
i2 ∈ BRi2(g2
−i2). Hence we have δ(g1) < δ(g2) since player i2
had formed no links in g1. More generally, gk is deﬁned as follows: gk is adjacent to
gk−1, g
k−1









ik−1. By construction, we have: δ(gk−1) < δ(gk). Let gm denote the
network after agents i1,...,...,ik,...,im have sequentially chosen a best response and
there is no other player i  ∈ {i1,...,im} who has an incentive to form links in gm. Let
C = g1,g2,...,gm be the improving path from g1 to gm. This path is ﬁnite and m ≤ n.
There are now two possible cases.
1. No player ik, k ∈ {1,...,m}, has an incentive to change her strategy. Then the
proof is complete.
2. There exists a player ik, k ∈ {1,...,m}, who has an incentive to modify her strat-







−i1). Clearly player i1 has no incentive to reduce the total number of
her links in gm. Indeed, we have c−i1(gm) > c−i1(g1). Hence for all ci1(g) < ci1(g1),
by the property of increasing diﬀerence we get that 0 < ui1(ci1(g1),c−i1(g1)) −
ui1(ci1(g),c−i1(g1)) < ui1(ci1(g1),c−i1(gm)) − ui1(ci1(g),c−i1(gm)). Since player
i1 changes her strategy we have ci1(gm)  = ci1(g(1)). Consequently, we have
ci1(gm) < ci1(g(1)) and c−i1(gm) = c−i1(g(1)) which implies that δ(gm) < δ(g(1)).
If g(1) is not a Nash equilibrium there are two possibilities.
1. There exists a player ℓ  ∈ {i1,...,im} such that g
(1)







−ℓ). Then let NBR(g(2)) = {i1,...,im} ∪ {ℓ} to be the set of players who





−ℓ, and δ(g(1)) < δ(g(2)), since by construction player ℓ has not formed
any links in g(1).
2. There does not exist a player ℓ  ∈ {i1,...,im} such that g
(1)
ℓ  ∈ BRℓ(g
(1)
−ℓ). In that
case, we have NBR(g(2)) = {i1,...,im} and there exists a player j ∈ {i2,...,im}
such that g
(1)











using the property of increasing diﬀerences we obtain δ(g(1)) < δ(g(2)).
More generally, we deﬁne g(k) as follows: g(k) is adjacent to g(k−1), g(k−1) is not a Nash
network, and:
1. if there exists a player, say ℓ′  ∈ NBR(g(k−1)), such that g
(k−1)







−ℓ′ . In that case, we have NBR(g(k)) = NBR(g(k−1)) ∪ {ℓ′};
2. otherwise, there exists a player, say j′ ∈ NBR(g(k−1)), such that g
(k−1)
j′  ∈ BRj′
(g
(k−1)








−j′ and NBR(g(k)) =
36NBR(g(k−1)).
For case 1, δ(g(k)) > δ(g(k−1)) since player ℓ′ has formed no links in g(k−1) but has formed
links in g(k). For case 2, δ(g(k)) > δ(g(k−1)) by the property of increasing diﬀerences.
To summarize, if the empty network is not a Nash network, then there is an improving
path, C = g0,...,gℓ,gℓ+1,...,gt, from the network ˙ g = g0 to a network g′ = gt.
Moreover, for all gℓ ∈ C, gℓ  = gt, δ(gℓ+1) > δ(gℓ). Hence, there does not exist any
improving cycle between ˙ g and g′.
Since the set G is ﬁnite and there does not exist any improving cycle, the improving
path beginning from the empty network ˙ g is ﬁnite. Hence a Nash network always exists.
The proof of the existence of Nash networks in one-way ﬂow models with global
spillovers and decreasing diﬀerences is similar, except that we need to start with the
complete network. ￿
The next example illustrates the importance of this result in a Cournot model.
Example 4 Cost reducing collaborative activities in oligopoly.2 Consider an homoge-
neous product Cournot Oligopoly consisting of n ex ante symmetric ﬁrms who face the
linear inverse demand function p = α −
P
i∈N qi, α > 0. The ﬁrms initially have zero
ﬁxed costs and identical constant returns-to-scale cost functions. Establishing a link
lowers marginal costs in a linear way: Ci(g) = γ0 − γci(g), where γ0 is a positive pa-
rameter representing a ﬁrm i’s marginal cost if it has no link. Given any network g, the
Cournot equilibrium output can be written as:
qi(g) =
(α − γ0) + nγci(g) − γc−i(g)
(n + 1)
,i ∈ N.
2This model is taken from Billand and Bravard (2004, [2]).
37The Cournot prodits for ﬁrm i ∈ N are given by ui(ci(g),c−i(g)) = (qi(g))
2 − fci(g),
where f is the cost of establishing a link. Let us deﬁne g′ in which there exists a player
j such that g′
−j = g−j and
P
k =j gj,k =
P
k =j g′
j,k + 1. We get:




and ∆ui decreases with ci(g). The proﬁt function satisﬁes decreasing diﬀerences. Hence,
by proposition 4, there always exists a Nash network.
2.2 One-Way Flow Model with Global Spillovers and Discrete
Convexity
We now give a new condition allowing for the existence of Nash networks: the discrete
convexity property. We begin by characterizing this property. Then, we examine the
existence of Nash networks in this setting and characterize the architectures of these
networks.
2.2.1 Discrete convexity
A function f :
R →











We consider a similar property for a function deﬁned on the discrete space X ⊂
Z,
inspired by Ui (2005, [11]).3 Let |x| = max{−x,x}. We say that a function f : X →
R
3Ui (2005, [11]) deals with discrete concavity and provides a more general deﬁnition of larger mid-
point property.
38satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property if, for any x,y,z ∈ X, with |x − y| = 2,
and |z − x| = |z − y| = 1, there exists t ∈ (0,1), such that,
f(z) < tf(x) + (1 − t)f(y).
Note that, in deﬁning the strict smaller midpoint property, we postulate that the mid-
point of x,y ∈ X is z ∈ X.
We assume that for all i ∈ N, the payoﬀ function ui satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property in the ﬁrst argument. That is, for any x ∈ A, y ∈ A, z ∈ {1,...,n−
2}, with |x − y| = 2, and |z − x| = |z − y| = 1, and for all w ∈ B, there exists t ∈ (0,1)
such that:
ui(z,w) < tui(x,w) + (1 − t)ui(y,w),∀i ∈ N.
For simplicity, we assume that ui( , ) = u( , ), for all i ∈ N. Dropping the subscript we
can write this as:
u(z,w) < tu(x,w) + (1 − t)u(y,w). (5)
We now give some results about functions which satisfy the strict smaller midpoint
property.
Lemma 7 A function u : A × B →
R satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property in
the ﬁrst argument if and only if, for any z ∈ {1,...,n − 2} and for any w ∈ B, with
|x − z| = |z − y| = 1, x  = y,
u(z,w) < max{u(x,w),u(y,w)} (6)
Proof Without loss of generality, suppose that u(x,w) ≥ u(y,w), and (5) is true. Then
we have:
u(z,w) < tu(x,w) + (1 − t)u(y,w) ≤ u(x,w),
39and (6) holds.
Without loss of generality, let u(x,w) ≥ u(y,w), and (6) be true. Then we can
choose t suﬃciently large (t < 1), such that tu(x,w)+(1−t)u(y,w) is suﬃciently close
to u(x,w) and thus (5) is true. Therefore (5) and (6) are equivalent. ￿
Lemma 8 Suppose that the payoﬀ function u : A × B →
R satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property in the ﬁrst argument. If u(n−1,w) ≤ u(n−2,w) for all w ∈ B, then
u(z,w) > u(z + 1,w) for all z ∈ {0,...,n − 3}.
Proof Assume that u(n − 1,w) ≤ u(n − 2,w) for all w ∈ B. By Lemma 7, we
know that u(n − 2,w) < max{u(n − 3,w),u(n − 1,w)}. Given that u(n − 2,w) <
max{u(n − 3,w),u(n − 1,w)} and u(n − 1,w) ≤ u(n − 2,w) for all w ∈ B, we have
u(n − 2,w) < u(n − 3,w). Suppose now that there exists k ∈ {1,...,n − 3} such that
u(k,w) > u(k +1,w) for all w ∈ B. Then, by Lemma 7, we have u(k,w) < u(k −1,w).
￿
Lemma 9 Suppose that the payoﬀ function u : A × B →
R satisﬁes the strict smaller
midpoint property in the ﬁrst argument. Then, for any w ∈ B, we have
max{u(0,w),u(n− 1,w)} > u(z,w),∀z ∈ {1,...,n − 2}.
Proof By Lemma 8 we know that if u(n−1,w) ≤ u(n−2,w), then u(z,w) < u(z−1,w),
for all z ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. Hence, u(0,w) > u(z,w) for all z ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. Also,
assume that u(n − 1,w) > u(n − 2,w). There are now two cases.
1. Suppose u(0,w) < u(1,w),. Then by Lemma 7, u(1,w) < u(2,w), for all w ∈ B.
Moreover, if there exists k ∈ {3,...,n − 2} such that u(k − 1,w) < u(k,w),
40then by Lemma 7, u(k,w) < u(k + 1,w). Hence, u(n − 1,w) > u(z,w) for all
z ∈ {1,...,n − 2}.
2. Suppose u(0,w) ≥ u(1,w) for all w ∈ B. Then, we show that there exists a unique
d ∈ {2,...,n − 2} such that u(d − 1,w) > u(d,w) < u(d + 1,u).
• If d does not exist, then we know that u( ,w) is decreasing in its ﬁrst argument
and we have a contradiction since u(n − 1,w) > u(n − 2,w).
• Suppose that there exist d and d′, d  = d′, such that u(d − 1,w) > u(d,w) <
u(d+1,w) and u(d′−1,w) > u(d′,w) < u(d′+1,w). Without loss of generality
let d′ > d. Since u(d,w) < u(d + 1,w), we have u(d + 1,w) < u(d + 2,w)
and by induction u(d + k,w) < u(d + k + 1,w) for all k ∈ {1,...,n − d − 2}
and w ∈ B. Hence, there does not exist d′ ∈ {d + 2,...,n − 2} such that
u(d′ − 1,w) > u(d′,w) < u(d′ + 1,w) which yields a contradiction.
Therefore, we have for all z ∈ {1,...,d}, u(0,w) > u(z,w), for all w ∈ B and we
have for all z ∈ {d,...,n− 2}, u(n−1,w) > u(z,w), for all w ∈ B. This gives us
the desired conclusion.
￿
2.2.2 Existence of Nash Networks and Discrete Convexity
Let us deﬁne two strategies for player i ∈ N: gi = 0 with ci(g) = 0 (player i forms no
links) and gi = n − 1 with ci(g) = n − 1 (player i forms a link with each of the other
players).
41Lemma 10 Suppose that the payoﬀ function u( , ) satisﬁes strict smaller midpoint
property. Then, the best response of each player i ∈ N is either 0 or n − 1.
Proof To obtain a contradiction, assume that there exist a player i ∈ N and a network
g ∈ G such that BRi(g)  ∈ {0,n − 1}. Then, there exists g ∈ G such that ci(g) ∈
{2,...,n − 2}, c−i(g) ∈ B, u(ci(g),c−i(g)) ≥ u(0,c−i(g)) and u(ci(g),c−i(g)) ≥ u(n −
1,n−i(g)). By Lemma 9, we have for any ci(g) ∈ {2,...,n − 2},
max{u(0,c−i(g)),u(n − 1,c−i(g))} > u(ci(g),c−i(g)),∀n−i(g) ∈ B,
which is a contradiction. ￿
Proposition 5 Suppose that the payoﬀ function u( , ) satisﬁes the strict smaller mid-
point property. Then the one-way ﬂow model with global spillovers contains a Nash
network.
Proof We start from the empty network ˙ g, and show that we can reach a Nash network.
In other words, there is no improving cycle originating from the empty network. If there
is no improving path from ˙ g, we are done. Otherwise, there exists a player, say i1, such
that 0  ∈ BRi1(˙ g−i1). Hence, by Lemma 10, we have, BRi1(˙ g−i1) = n − 1. Let g1 be
the network in which no player has formed links except player i1 who has formed n− 1
links. Either g1 is a Nash network and we are done, or there is a player say i2 such
that 0  ∈ BRi2(g1
−i2). In the latter case, by lemma 10, we have BRi2(g1
−i2) = n − 1.
Let g2 be the network in which no player has formed links except players i1 and i2
who have formed n − 1 links. We observe that player i1 has no incentive to modify her
strategy in g2. Indeed, we have BRi = BRj for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, and by construction
42g2
−i1 = g2
−i2. Therefore, if BRi2(g1
−i2) = n−1, then BRi1(g2
−i1) = n−1. More generally,
we deﬁne gk the network in which no player has formed links except players i1,i2,...,ik
who have formed n − 1 links and BRi(gk
−i) = n − 1 for all i ∈ {i1,...,ik}. Either
gk is a Nash network and we are done, or there exists a player, say ik+1, such that
0  ∈ BRik+1(gk
−ik+1). By Lemma 10, BRik+1(gk
−ik+1) = n − 1. Let gk+1 be the network
in which no player has formed links except players iℓ, with ℓ ∈ {1,...,k + 1} who has
formed n−1 links. We observe that players iℓ have no incentive to modify their strategy




−ik for all i ∈ {i1,...,ik}.
Hence, there does not exist any improving cycle starting from ˙ g and, since the set
of players N is ﬁnite, a Nash network exists. ￿
2.2.3 Characterization of Nash Networks and Discrete Convexity
We deﬁne a class of networks that are important in what follows. A network g is a
k-all-or-nothing network if k ﬁrms have established links with all other ﬁrms while n−k
ﬁrms have formed no link.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the payoﬀ function u( , ) satisﬁes strict smaller midpoint
property. The Nash networks are k-all-or-nothing networks.
Proof We know by Lemma 10 that in a Nash network each player forms either 0 or
n − 1 links. ￿
Now, we state suﬃcient conditions for the empty and complete networks to be Nash
networks.
43Proposition 7 Suppose u( , ) has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in its two arguments
and satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property.
1. The complete network is the unique Nash network if and only if u(n − 1,(n − 1)2)
> u(0,(n − 1)2).
2. The empty network is a Nash network if u(0,0) > u(n − 1,0).
Proof Since the second part of the proposition is straightforward, we only prove the
ﬁrst part. First, it is obvious that if the complete network is the unique Nash network,
then u(n − 1,(n − 1)2) > u(0,(n − 1)2). Second, we show that if u(n − 1,(n − 1)2)
> u(0,(n − 1)2) then the complete network is the unique Nash network. Indeed, as-
sume that there is a non complete network g∗ which is a Nash network. We have
u(ci(g∗),c−i(g∗)) ≥ u(ci(g),c−i(g∗)), for all g ∈ G and for all i ∈ N. By decreasing
diﬀerence property, we have:
u(n − 1,(n − 1)
2￿
> u(0,(n − 1)
2￿





for all c−i(g) ∈ {0,...,(n − 1)2 − 1}. By Lemma 10, and the strict smaller midpoint
property, we have:
u(n − 1,c−i(g)) > u(0,c−i(g)) ⇒ u(n − 1,c−i(g)) > u(ci(g),c−i(g)),
for all ci(g) ∈ {0,...,n−2}. This tells us that each player i always has an incentive to
form n−1 links in g∗. Hence, g∗ cannot be a Nash network which gives us the necessary
contradiction. ￿
Example 5 Consider again the framework described in example 4. Let g′ be the net-
work such that g′
−i = g−i and
P
j =i gi,j =
P
j =i g′
i,j+1 (g is supposed to be a non empty
44network) and let g′′ be the network such that g′′
−i = g−i and
P




We show that the proﬁt function satisﬁes the strict smaller midpoint property, that is
u(ci(g),c−i(g)) < max{u(ci(g′),c−i(g′)),u(ci(g′′),c−i(g′′))}. To obtain a contradiction,
assume that u(ci(g),c−i(g)) ≥ max{u(ci(g′),c−i(g′)),u(ci(g′′),c−i(g′′))}. Then,
u(ci(g),c−i(g)) − u(ci(g′),c−i(g′)) ≥ 0
u(ci(g′′),c−i(g′′)) − u(ci(g),c−i(g)) ≤ 0
But, straightforward calculations give us:





which is a contradiction.
Since u has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in its two arguments and satisﬁes the
strict smaller midpoint property, we can conclude, by proposition 6, that Nash networks
are k-all-or-nothing networks. Moreover, by proposition 7, we know that the complete
network is the unique Nash network if and only if u(n − 1,(n − 1)2) > u(0,(n − 1)2)
and the empty network is a Nash network if u(0,0) > u(n − 1,0).
Concluding remarks
Much of the existing literature on one-way ﬂow models contains the assertion that for
some parameters ranges, the models admit Nash networks with speciﬁc properties. This
amounts to providing suﬃcient conditions for the existence of Nash networks. However,
these conditions often do not cover the entire parameters space and are unable to answer
if Nash networks always exist. Our paper ﬁlls this void in the literature.
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